Algerian revolutionaries split between moderates and hard-liners over the pied noir presence

Evidence

Here it was abundantly evident to the French team that there existed a fundamental dichotomy between the “old guard” Algerian revolutionaries, such as Krim and Abbas, prepared to accept the continued existence of a pied noir “presence”, and the hard-liners already bent upon a future Algeria from which they would eventually be excluded: Boumedienne and Ben Bella. Though, for the time being, it might seem that Krim represented the majority view, who could predict what hand would hold the reins of power in three, five or ten years’ time? — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1435

Categorization

• XREF: The moderate-versus-hardliner split foreshadows which faction won Algeria after 1962 and elsewhere in decolonisation. — connects to: The Algerian negotiating camp was deeply split between Boumedienne’s hard-liners and Krim’s politicos.; Pied noir surgeons aided the F.L.N. out of Algerian national identity — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 428; Pied noir factions demanded a second front against FLN and Paris alike. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 462 (+2 more)

Related

• The Algerian negotiating camp was deeply split between Boumedienne’s hard-liners and Krim’s politicos. (similarity 0.88)
• Liberal moderates in Algeria became revolutionaries through successive disillusionments (similarity 0.87)
• Pied noir factions demanded a second front against FLN and Paris alike. (similarity 0.85)
• France’s rejection of moderate Algerian reformers radicalized them into revolutionaries (similarity 0.83)
• European liberal intellectuals in Algeria faced impossible conscience conflicts as the war radicalized. (similarity 0.83)
• Algeria hosted several simultaneous revolutions on distinct levels (similarity 0.83)
• Army hard-liners under Boumedienne challenged the F.L.N. political leadership (similarity 0.83)
• Repeated disillusion pushed liberal moderates toward revolutionary extremism (similarity 0.83)
• Algeria’s moderate third force was crushed between the F.L.N. and the O.A.S. (similarity 0.82)
• French rejection of moderates repeatedly drove them toward revolutionary extremism (similarity 0.82)
• France’s refusal to restrain settler fascism drove liberal Algerians to the F.L.N. (similarity 0.82)
• Rural Algerians underwent a profound revolutionary politicization that French administrators could not reverse. (similarity 0.82)
• The pied noir lobby immediately demanded violent suppression of the revolt (similarity 0.82)
• Army chief-of-staff post shifted real F.L.N. power to Boumedienne’s hardliners (similarity 0.82)
• The French Left’s inaction eliminated any liberal alternative for Algeria’s Europeans (similarity 0.82)

Broader Connections

• Algeria hosted several simultaneous revolutions on distinct levels #expands (0.55) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 10