Intuitive representativeness heuristics systematically override logical probability reasoning
Evidence
In Adams, the question was the nature of the responsibility of the owner of a steamboat with sleeping compartments to an overnight passenger whose money had been stolen when, allegedly through the company’s negligence, a burglar broke into the plaintiff’s sleeping compartment. What makes the case interesting is that two divergent bodies of law were both potentially applicable. If the law pertaining to open sleeping compartments in railroad cars was applicable, then the company would not have been liable, but if the law pertaining to innkeepers applied, then the plaintiff would have been able to recover. The question was then whether the steamboat with closed passenger cabins was more like a railroad sleeping car or more like a hotel. … But in deciding that the steamboat was more like a hotel than a railroad sleeping car, the response to the skeptical challenge would go, the court did not first imagine what, on the basis of policy or principle, the best rule would be and then determine similarity on that basis. Rather, it looked at the two possibilities and simply “saw” more of a similarity in one direction than another. This might in theory have been reducible to some rule, but the rule did not consciously exist in the minds of the judges at the time they identified the similarity, so in fact for the judges the identification of similarity was a primary mental activity. — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 183 (
#corroborates, via linked claim)
Furthermore, in determining that status, one slips from an epistemology of manifest observation and statements of fact into an epistemology of suspicion in which a targeting decision is based on the identification of behavior or a pattern of life that suggests membership in a hostile organization. For example, your pattern of life might suggest a 70 percent chance that you are a militant, in other words a combatant, and we accordingly have the right to kill you. — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 482 (
#exemplifies, via linked claim)
J. S. Mill reduced it to a formula: Two things resemble each other in one or more respects; a certain proposition is true of one; therefore it is true of the other.5 In legal analogies, we may have two cases which resemble each other in a great many properties, and we infer that some additional property in one will be found in the other. — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 570 (
#corroborates, via linked claim)
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Analogical reasoning can operate as an intuitive particular-to-particular leap without a conscious rule — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 183; Analogical reasoning infers additional properties from shared case similarities — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 570; Drone targeting decisions rest on probabilistic inference from behavior rather than observed facts. — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 482 (+2 more)
Related
- Analogical reasoning can operate as an intuitive particular-to-particular leap without a conscious rule (similarity 0.83)
- A single bone fragment can reveal the whole animal’s class through analogical reasoning (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- Analogical reasoning can operate as an intuitive particular-to-particular leap without a conscious rule
#corroborates(0.80) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 183 - Analogical reasoning infers additional properties from shared case similarities
#corroborates(0.75) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 570 - Drone targeting decisions rest on probabilistic inference from behavior rather than observed facts.
#exemplifies(0.75) — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 482