Procedural ethics cannot justify principles without empirical accounts of persons

Evidence

This does seem fairly perverse. How can the formulation and rational justification of ethical principles avoid discussion of concrete social worlds, both actual and possible? How can they eschew giving some account of the person? And how can consideration of human beings and their social relationships eschew empirical enquiry? — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, 426

Categorization

• XREF: The author’s rejoinder to Habermas mirrors Jameson’s core attack: universalist moral claims that refuse concrete social content collapse into empty formalism — a classical Marxist-Hegelian objection. — connects to: An ethics cannot be derived directly from ontological descriptions; Habermas restricts moral philosophy to procedural justification, leaving substance to citizens — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist…, 424; Truth about persons is grasped a priori, not discovered by empirical search — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1336 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Truth about persons is grasped a priori, not discovered by empirical search #contradicts (0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1336