An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply

Evidence

The minimum requirement for an efficient outcome is that the bear be able to incur an enforcible promise and that he be able to transmit credible evidence that he is committed, either by a penalty incurred or by a maneuver that destroys his power not to comply (like extracting his own teeth and claws). — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 345

Categorization

• DEFINE: Two distinct commitment routes: incurring a penalty vs. physically destroying one’s power to defect — ‘extracting his own teeth and claws’ is the vivid version.
• ADDENDUM: The ‘destroying the power not to comply’ limb parallels the Osage-orange/extinct-megafauna mechanism in ‘Grafting & Growth’ — the tree’s thorns only make sense against an antagonist whose threat was the reason for the defense.
• XREF: connects to: Irreversible commitments force the enemy, not oneself, to be the one who yields. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 433; Commitments are often manufactured by removing one’s own control over action — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 714; Inability to make enforceable promises can shield someone from extortion — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 722 (+5 more)

Related

• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.82)
• Irreversible commitments force the enemy, not oneself, to be the one who yields. (similarity 0.79)
• A promise must be enforceable or releasable by the receiving party to work (similarity 0.79)
• Commitment includes removing options, delegating fulfilment, and self-handicapping (similarity 0.79)
• Enforcing one’s own promises requires a supporting legal or information structure (similarity 0.78)
• Commitments are often manufactured by removing one’s own control over action (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 317