Algerian war manpower losses strained France’s economy more than military outlay

Evidence

In the army as a whole, senior officers — the men of forty in Algeria — weighed down by all the burden of bad dreams and stresses that the past had imposed on their beloved army, left prematurely, settled down to writing their memoirs, or withdrew entirely. General André Beaufre, France’s greatest military thinker, who resigned rather than take command over a still bitterly divided army, died early. General Gambiez, the ill-starred Commander-in-Chief at the time of the 1961 generals’ putsch, retired in 1967 and took up writing history. Colonel Trinquier, the tough para leader during the Battle of Algiers, went to Katanga as a mercenary before the end of the Algerian war, then retired to devote himself to viticulture. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1665 (#expands, via linked claim)

The war in Algeria (which lasted nearly eight years—almost twice as long as the “Great War” of 1914–18) toppled six French prime ministers and the Fourth Republic itself. It came close to bringing down General de Gaulle and his Fifth Republic and confronted metropolitan France with the threat of civil war. Yet, when defeat led to the cession of this corner-stone of her empire where she had been “chez elle” for 132 years, out of it arose an incomparably greater France than the world had seen for many a generation. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 8 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: French workers’ domestic resistance to capitalism shortened Algeria’s war; Algerian war conscription cost France more in lost productivity than in military outlay; The Algerian war emptied France’s officer corps of its finest leaders — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1665 (+1 more)

Related

• The Algerian war emptied France’s officer corps of its finest leaders (similarity 0.90)
• Defeat in Algeria paradoxically produced a stronger France (similarity 0.85)
• French workers’ domestic resistance to capitalism shortened Algeria’s war (similarity 0.85)
• Algeria’s loss paradoxically produced a stronger postcolonial France (similarity 0.84)
• Severing Algeria proved a net economic gain for France (similarity 0.81)
• Algeria would be lost on France’s interior political front, not on the military front (similarity 0.81)
• Colonial military dominance ceased to be decisive in Algeria’s war. (similarity 0.81)
• Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria (similarity 0.80)
• Heavy-handed military reprisals in Algeria drove more Algerians to join the rebels. (similarity 0.80)
• The French army’s 1940 humiliation fueled its determination not to lose Algeria. (similarity 0.80)
• Soustelle predicted France would lose Algeria on the home front, not militarily. (similarity 0.80)
• The French army in Algeria transformed from clumsy to effective by 1956 (similarity 0.80)
• Army officers saw the Algerian war as both career security and a noble cause. (similarity 0.79)
• France’s Algerian military dominance coexisted with its political weakness at home (similarity 0.79)
• By late 1956 both France’s military and diplomatic options in Algeria had failed (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• The Algerian war emptied France’s officer corps of its finest leaders #expands (0.45) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1665
• Algeria’s loss paradoxically produced a stronger postcolonial France #complicates (0.30) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 8