Adding free speech barely changes a tacit bargaining game’s character

Evidence

So the introduction of uninhibited speech may not greatly alter the character of the game, even though the particular outcome is different. The dependence of the two players on conveying their intentions to each other and perceiving the intentions of each other, of behaving in predictable patterns and acquiescing in rules or limits, is much the same as before. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 249

Categorization

• XREF: Surprising conclusion that bears on why small acts of decorum toward corpses — actions, not words — matter more than practical logic in building trust and commitment. — connects to: Every bargaining game ends in a simultaneous final move made in ignorance — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 617; Tacit bargaining over distribution can be conducted only through play itself. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 791; Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 187 (+1 more)

Related

• Tacit bargaining over distribution can be conducted only through play itself. (similarity 0.81)
• Tacit and explicit bargaining form one continuum dependent on coordinated expectations (similarity 0.81)
• Tacit-bargaining theory guides where to seek terms, not their probability (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 187