A private judge can solve collective punishment problems by centralizing information and adjudication.
Evidence
The institution that we model as the resolution of these problems is based on the presence of a specialized actor - a “judge” or “law merchant” (LM) who serves both as a repository of information and as an adjudicator of disputes. The core version of our model is based on the following assumptions. After any exchange, each party can accuse the other of cheating and appeal to the LM. Any dispute appealed to the LM is perfectly and honestly adjudicated at cost C to the plaintiff. (We consider the case of a dishonest LM later.) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 79
Categorization
- XREF: Directly matches the reading purpose reference to Milgrom, North, and Weingast’s private judges model and to Don Corleone as third-party enforcer in the Godfather opening. — connects to: Centralized adjudicators solve trade by combining information storage with dispute resolution — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 79; Private-judge trading systems succeed only when enforcement costs stay low — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 15; Private enforcement institutions restore cooperation but impose priced transaction costs. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 125 (+1 more)
- DEFINE: Definitionally clarifies what a ‘law merchant’ is in this institutional modeling literature: a repository of information plus an adjudicator.
Related
- Trade institutions must solve both an information and a punishment-motivation problem (similarity 0.86)
- Centralized adjudicators solve trade by combining information storage with dispute resolution (similarity 0.85)
- Private-judge trading systems succeed only when enforcement costs stay low (similarity 0.79)
- Private judges bundle self-interested services with community-benefiting enforcement (similarity 0.78)
- A private forum can incentivize information-gathering by tying appeals to prior queries. (similarity 0.78)
- Private enforcement institutions restore cooperation but impose priced transaction costs. (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Centralized adjudicators solve trade by combining information storage with dispute resolution
#corroborates(0.90) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 79 - A private forum can incentivize information-gathering by tying appeals to prior queries.
#expands(0.80) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 120 - Private-judge trading systems succeed only when enforcement costs stay low
#qualifies(0.75) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 15 - Private enforcement institutions restore cooperation but impose priced transaction costs.
#qualifies(0.75) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 125