Private judges bundle self-interested services with community-benefiting enforcement

Evidence

Intuitively, the system of private judges accomplishes its objectives by bundling the services which are valuable to the individual trader with services that are valuable to the community, so that a trader pursuing his individual interest serves the community’s interest as well. Unless a trader makes appropriate queries, he cannot use the system to resolve disputes. The requirement that the traders make queries provides an opportunity for the judge to collect payments for his services even if no actual disputes arise. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 16

Categorization

• XREF: The bundling mechanism that aligns self-interest with collective benefit echoes Adam Smith’s invisible hand and modern platform-design thinking, e.g. Nudge and marketplace trust design. — connects to: A judge’s self-interest in avoiding admitted error shapes legal rulings — Jonathan Harr, A Civil Action, 2732; Private legal systems can rival state law when reputation functions as enforcement. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 16; Pre-state trading communities sustained honesty through reputation systems backed by private judges. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 1 (+2 more)

Related

• Private-judge trading systems succeed only when enforcement costs stay low (similarity 0.79)
• A private judge can solve collective punishment problems by centralizing information and adjudication. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• A judge’s self-interest in avoiding admitted error shapes legal rulings #expands (0.78) — Jonathan Harr, A Civil Action, 2732