JESSICA CARRICK-HAGENBARTH — Institutional Bricolage and Commoning in Community- Driven Development Projects in Brazilian Agrarian Settlements
38 published claims from this book.
- A landless-peasants movement secured World Bank funds by occupying state offices.
- Agrarian settlements reject external sanction frameworks, preferring graduated enforcement that preserves social cohesion
- Agrarian settlers met cost-sharing requirements through labor rather than cash.
- An MST occupation of state offices forced unusual World Bank development funds access.
- Blanket exclusion sanctions clash with communal settlement values and practical needs.
- Bricolage thrives where external frameworks fail to align with local realities.
- Bureaucratic proposal requirements exceeded settlers’ literacy capacities, forcing outside help.
- CDD persists in World Bank lending despite inconclusive evidence of its effectiveness
- CDD projects fail even under ideal social-capital conditions, exposing model flaws.
- Collective work supplied male-performed infrastructure maintenance per household.
- Commoning transforms participants’ identities even as it embeds practices of power and difference
- Communities adapt externally imposed development projects through bricolage processes of alteration, aggregation, and articulation.
- Communities comply minimally with donor rules while keeping their own governance practices operative
- Community-driven development institutions do not spill over into everyday community governance
- Cooperatives reproduce themselves through shared governance and yield both material and immaterial common resources.
- Debt obligations strained but rarely dissolved collective commons practices.
- Direct-action occupation yielded MST control over settlement selection and $15 million in funding.
- External development requirements parallel and are met by preexisting local governance institutions
- Externally imposed institutions fail when they contradict socially embedded ways of doing things.
- Formal state accounting requirements imposed burdens that delayed fund disbursement and damaged project outcomes.
- Funding tranches went unpaid when families lacked managerial experience.
- Institutional bricolage faces hard limits on what repurposed arrangements can achieve.
- Institutional bricolage operates through alteration, aggregation, and articulation.
- Institutions are fluid arrangements that blur any formal-informal binary.
- Occupied and market-based settlements follow distinct paths to commoning
- Post-implementation technical support, not initial funding, determines project survival.
- Pre-existing institutional strength determined whether aggregation improved project outcomes
- Project type determines how much ongoing collective work and learning communities must sustain.
- Settlement residents merged legal project associations with their existing communal body
- Settlements grafted project management onto existing governance rather than forming new systems
- Settlements prioritized social relationships over strict rule enforcement when sanctioning.
- Shared histories of precarious labor united settlers in Brazilian land reform.
- Shared identity underpins commoner formation and collective action.
- Some land occupations were union-initiated among strangers with no prior land ties.
- State fund-release delays pushed farmers to plant outside the rainy season, dooming crops.
- Strong governance enables complex projects while weak governance causes their failure.
- Technical complexity in aid bureaucracy reproduces class-based power asymmetries.
- The appropriations form forced governors to affirm compensation they could not verify