Worn-down interior fighters threatened to accept de Gaulle’s terms without the G.P.R.A.

Evidence

By the end of 1958 Amirouche and his fellow commanders had their Wilayas in a grip of terror, while jointly the power they exerted in relation to the absentee G.P.R.A. was hardly less daunting. Hard on the heels of the purge in his own Wilaya, Amirouche was writing a fierce letter to the G.P.R.A. in Tunis, accusing it of bourgeois taints and of half-heartedness in its attempts to breach the Morice Line, and calling upon it to launch a “national purification” similar to his own. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 982 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Interior F.L.N. commanders sought a separate peace that bypassed the G.P.R.A.; Interior fighters threatened to break from the G.P.R.A. and negotiate directly with de Gaulle.; Interior Wilaya commanders wielded power greater than the exiled G.P.R.A. government. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 982

Related

• Interior fighters threatened to break from the G.P.R.A. and negotiate directly with de Gaulle. (similarity 0.95)
• Interior F.L.N. commanders sought a separate peace that bypassed the G.P.R.A. (similarity 0.93)
• Wilaya commanders used purges to challenge G.P.R.A. political authority (similarity 0.90)
• Interior Wilaya commanders wielded power greater than the exiled G.P.R.A. government. (similarity 0.90)
• The F.L.N. created the G.P.R.A. to counter de Gaulle and reclaim the initiative. (similarity 0.85)
• The G.P.R.A. liquidated the Wilaya 4 leaders who negotiated with de Gaulle. (similarity 0.84)
• De Gaulle appealed directly to the G.P.R.A. despite the private deal with Si Salah (similarity 0.80)
• The G.P.R.A. deliberately engineered its own rejection to discredit de Gaulle’s initiative. (similarity 0.80)
• De Gaulle’s mystical self-assurance blinded him to the F.L.N.’s political character. (similarity 0.80)
• De Gaulle privately favored negotiating with the Algerian rebels as early as 1957 (similarity 0.79)
• F.L.N. deliberately sabotaged its own negotiating openings to deny de Gaulle international credit (similarity 0.79)
• De Gaulle’s soldier’s language misread F.L.N. psychology and ensured rejection of his peace offer. (similarity 0.78)
• De Gaulle’s conciliatory gestures angered the army while winning no concessions from the F.L.N. (similarity 0.78)
• De Gaulle’s allies saw Algeria as subordinate to the French state’s crisis (similarity 0.78)
• Algeria was only one element of de Gaulle’s larger ambitions. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Interior fighters threatened to break from the G.P.R.A. and negotiate directly with de Gaulle. #expands (0.90)
• Interior Wilaya commanders wielded power greater than the exiled G.P.R.A. government. #expands (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 982