Winning the War on Terror required ideological hegemony alongside military force

Evidence

This extensive campaign makes clear that winning the War on Terror requires not only military and financial strength but also ideological hegemony. In other words, the levels of warfare are many, and ideological engagement is often as crucial as drone strikes or forward operating bases. As Tucker Eskew, director of the White House’s Office of Global Communications, has stated, “We’re fighting a war of ideas as much as a war on terror,” explicitly referring to both the ideological and violent state apparatuses that are central to the U.S. imperial project. — Evelyn Alsultany, Arabs and Muslims in the Media, 1253

Categorization

• DEFINE: Introduces the framework that ‘war of ideas’ and armed warfare are twin ideological and violent apparatuses of the imperial project — the analytic lens the book’s media analysis rests on.
• XREF: Connects to how propaganda offices (Office of Strategic Influence, Office of Global Communications) function as soft-power military adjuncts, echoing Milgrom’s institutions-as-infrastructure thread. — connects to: War on Terror rhetoric was outsourced to pro-imperial intellectuals, not state officials — Deepa Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics of…, 499; The Bush Doctrine justified preemptive war to preserve oil-linked regional hegemony