Warnings differ from threats because warnings convey true incentives without commitment

Evidence

In ordinary language, “threat” is often used also for the case in which one merely points out to an adversary, or reminds him, that one would take action painful to the adversary if the latter fails to comply, it being clear that one would have incentive to do so. To “threaten” to call the police on a trespasser is of this sort, the threat to shoot him is not. But it seems better to use a different word for these cases—I suggest “warning” rather than “threat”—because the “threat” either is superfluous, and does not constitute a move, or it conveys true information and relates to situations with an information structure and communication structure worth keeping distinct. In this latter case it is a mutually beneficial move, precluding a jointly undesired outcome by improving the second party’s understanding. The main point of analytical similarity, between this “warning” case and that of the “threat,” is in the possible difficulty of conveying true information credibly, of conveying evidence for the assertion that one would have, ex post, incentive for doing as one warns he will. As a matter of fact, if a threat is of such nature (as it often is) that the act of commitment is not contained in the act of communicating it—if the commitment precedes the conveyance of the threat, with evidence for believing it, to the threatened party—the first act in the process of threatening changes the “true” incentive structure, and the second is, in effect, a “warning.” — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 763

Categorization

• DEFINE: Schelling’s distinction between ‘threat’ and ‘warning’ — a key terminological clarification for the private-enforcement framework.
• XREF: Connects to the reader’s Gambetta framework: the Mafia’s ‘threats’ to Bonasera’s enemies are often actually warnings about what the Corleones would naturally do — an important nuance for how the Godfather signals credibility. — connects to: Threats, promises, and commitments unify as payoff-restricting reaction functions — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 783; A mere duty to warn can outperform formal emission limits through market pressure — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 504

Broader Connections

• Threats, promises, and commitments unify as payoff-restricting reaction functions #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 783