A mere duty to warn can outperform formal emission limits through market pressure

Evidence

No company could easily bear the adverse market impacts of tying their product to an explicit warning of possible carcinogenic or reproductive toxicity. The resulting pressure for technological innovation led in turn to a series of significant reductions in toxic exposures in California. No formal emissions limitation or design standard was necessary—the general duty to warn, coupled with the threat of adverse public reaction in the marketplace, proved sufficient. — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 504

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s knowledge of information-disclosure regulation and behavioral economics of reputational risk. — connects to: Tradeable emissions rights could cut pollution at lower cost than command-and-control rules — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 799; Well-intentioned carbon credit incentives can be exploited to increase polluting production — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 1527; Warnings differ from threats because warnings convey true incentives without commitment — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 763 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Warnings differ from threats because warnings convey true incentives without commitment #expands (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 763
• Tradeable emissions rights could cut pollution at lower cost than command-and-control rules #corroborates (0.78) — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 799
• Consumption resists change because it is profitable and shielded from environmental costs #complicates (0.73) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 2986
• Well-intentioned carbon credit incentives can be exploited to increase polluting production #qualifies (0.72) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 1527