Warning is only as valuable as the pre-planned response it triggers

Evidence

Finally, while there may be arrangements that have a high probability of providing warning of the enemy’s preparation for an attack, the value of the system depends on what we can do if we do get warning. We can send off our own anticipatory strike, hoping to get in first; but this is an unattractive course if the warning is ambiguous. A false alarm then leads to war. And a true one precludes any last-minute deterrence. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 559

Categorization

• XREF: The ambiguity-of-warning problem that turns false alarms into war maps onto the commitment problem in deterrence theory. — connects to: Warning-time gains must be exploited via pre-planned negotiation or wasted — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 564; A critical warning can be inverted into a conservative political program

Related

• Warning-time gains must be exploited via pre-planned negotiation or wasted (similarity 0.87)
• A critical warning can be inverted into a conservative political program (similarity 0.86)