Warning-time gains must be exploited via pre-planned negotiation or wasted

Evidence

The solution is in two parts. First, one must try to design a super-alert response that has good endurance and little fatigue, recognizing that this means compromising its peak effectiveness. Second, and most pertinent to the present subject, one may have to engage in a kind of crash disarmament negotiation with the enemy during the period that one has in fact taken measures to insure his own invulnerability of retaliation. … It would mean negotiating not just under the ordinary pressure of knowing that sneak attack is a long-term danger, but doing it with clear notice that if measures to make successful first-strike impossible have not been devised, agreed upon, and taken by a quick deadline, war by mutual consent has become inevitable. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 564

Categorization

• QUESTION: The ultimatum-by-deadline-as-negotiation mechanism is worth chasing: is it structurally identical to the Don forcing a deal under threat?
• XREF: connects to: Warning is only as valuable as the pre-planned response it triggers — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 559; An agent should plan around its own future errors, not ideal execution — Brian Christian, The Alignment Problem, 1031

Related

• Warning is only as valuable as the pre-planned response it triggers (similarity 0.87)

Broader Connections

• Warning is only as valuable as the pre-planned response it triggers #corroborates (0.95) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 559
• An agent should plan around its own future errors, not ideal execution #expands (0.75) — Brian Christian, The Alignment Problem, 1031