Verification and falsification both presuppose that truth must draw consensus

Evidence

These two rules underlie what nineteenth-century science calls verification and twentieth-century science, falsification. They allow a horizon of consensus to be brought to the debate between partners (the sender and the addressee). Not every consensus is a sign of truth; but it is presumed that the truth of a statement necessarily draws a consensus. — Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 217

Categorization

• XREF: The consensus-horizon premise here is what Lyotard will later dismantle — and Jameson reads as the essential modern legitimation claim. — connects to: Consensus-based truth theories cannot justify specific assertions — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist…, 434; Theorizing truth must account for conflicts that resist closure. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 571; A leader can render a disputed proposition ‘true enough’ by practical fiat — Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, A Lot of People Are Saying: The New…, 132

Broader Connections

• Theorizing truth must account for conflicts that resist closure. #complicates (0.75) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 571