Consensus-based truth theories cannot justify specific assertions
Evidence
In any case, Habermas’s procedural conception of rationality does not seem tenable. Defining truth in terms of ideal consensus does not provide an account of the grounds on which a particular sentence is warrantedly assertible. — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, 434
Categorization
- XREF: Part of the sustained attack on Habermas’s procedural rationality that frames the book’s engagement with communicative action theory. — connects to: Verification and falsification both presuppose that truth must draw consensus — Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on…, 217; Modern science grounds truth rules in expert consensus, not transcendental authority — Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on…, 248; Scientific truth rests on a dialectical proof rule and a metaphysical non-deception rule — Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on…, 216 (+5 more)
Broader Connections
- Verification and falsification both presuppose that truth must draw consensus
#corroborates(0.82) — Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 217 - Modern science grounds truth rules in expert consensus, not transcendental authority
#exemplifies(0.80) — Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 248 - Reputation substitutes for truth in scientific and cognitive contexts
#corroborates(0.80) - Even deliberately inclusive identity spaces mute internal difference to achieve consensus
#exemplifies(0.78) — Neda Maghbouleh, The Limits of Whiteness, 517 - Scientific truth rests on a dialectical proof rule and a metaphysical non-deception rule
#complicates(0.75) — Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 216 - Belief system coherence is socially, not logically, driven
#qualifies(0.75) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 1857