The classical theory of truth remains indispensable for scientific practice

Evidence

Now both Habermas and Rorty would respond that the classical theory of truth, precisely because it is so strong - even our best theories may turn out to be false, is a metaphysical fifth wheel, of no use when it comes to actually making sense of the world. And both of them would be wrong. For one thing, the liability according to the classical theory of even the most ‘justified’ theory to falsehood implies a fallibilist conception of knowledge, in which theories are under­ stood as hypotheses subject to revision. For another, the objectivity of truth - independently of even the most ideal consensus, the truthvalue of a sentence depends on whether the world is the way it says it is — suggests that we impose some constraints upon the revision of our theories, that there may, from the point of view of attaining the truth, be better or worse of revising them. — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, 433

Categorization

• XREF: Joins the long-running realism debate against Rorty and pragmatism; connects to analytic realism literature (Devitt, Searle, Boghossian). — connects to: Modern science grounds truth rules in expert consensus, not transcendental authority — Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on…, 248; Each society has a regime of truth that determines what counts as true
• QUESTION: How persuasive is fallibilism alone as a refutation of the claim that classical truth is a ‘metaphysical fifth wheel’?

Broader Connections

• Modern science grounds truth rules in expert consensus, not transcendental authority #contradicts (0.80) — Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 248
• Each society has a regime of truth that determines what counts as true #contradicts (0.75)