Third-party enforcement can rely on conditional self-identification

Evidence

A nice identification game was uncovered in a New York suburb a few years ago. Certain motorists carried identity cards which identified them to policemen as members in a club; if the motorist with a membership card was arrested, he simply showed the card to the policeman and paid a bribe. The role of these cards was to identify the motorist as a person who, if the bribe was received, would keep quiet. It identified the motorist as a man whose promise was enforcible. But the card identifies the motorist only after he has been arrested; if the police could identify card-carrying motorists by looking at them, they could concentrate their arrests on card-carrying drivers, threatening a ticket unless payment were received. The card is contingent identification, at the option of the motorist. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 327

Categorization

• XREF: Directly instantiates Gambetta’s private protection model and Milgrom et al.’s private judges — the card is a private-enforcement signal that substitutes for state legitimacy, letting corrupt police price discrimination across a trusted client pool. — connects to: Both clients and genuine protectors demand clear identification signals; Self-enforcing constraints can induce honest behavior from dishonest actors.; Complementary agreements are self-enforcing through interdependence and focal points — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 312 (+1 more)
• DEFINE: Concrete example of contingent identification — a Schellingian mechanism where the signal of trustworthiness is only revealed at the moment of the transaction.

Related

• Both clients and genuine protectors demand clear identification signals (similarity 0.90)

Broader Connections

• Self-enforcing constraints can induce honest behavior from dishonest actors. #expands (0.80)
• Complementary agreements are self-enforcing through interdependence and focal points #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 312