Both clients and genuine protectors demand clear identification signals

Evidence

A nice identification game was uncovered in a New York suburb a few years ago. Certain motorists carried identity cards which identified them to policemen as members in a club; if the motorist with a membership card was arrested, he simply showed the card to the policeman and paid a bribe. The role of these cards was to identify the motorist as a person who, if the bribe was received, would keep quiet. It identified the motorist as a man whose promise was enforcible. But the card identifies the motorist only after he has been arrested; if the police could identify card-carrying motorists by looking at them, they could concentrate their arrests on card-carrying drivers, threatening a ticket unless payment were received. The card is contingent identification, at the option of the motorist. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 327 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Third-party enforcement can rely on conditional self-identification — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 327; Appearance-based identification systems are vulnerable to identity appropriation

Broader Connections