The past’s fixed in-itself character requires the for-itself to identify with itself

Evidence

But from the content of the past as such I can remove nothing, and I can add nothing to it. In other words the past which I was is what it is; it is an in-itself like the things in the world. The relation of being which I have to sustain with the past is a relation of the type of the in-itself—that is, an identification with itself. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 427

Categorization

• DEFINE: Positions the past as an in-itself with which the for-itself must sustain a relation of self-identification.
• XREF: connects to: The for-itself lacks a for-itself, not an in-itself, in its project of self-identification — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 373; The For-itself’s being consists in internal negation rather than self-coincidence — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 445; The For-itself retroactively constitutes the past from which it appears born — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 479 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• The past is a for-itself that has hardened into an in-itself #expands (0.90) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 434
• The For-itself’s being consists in internal negation rather than self-coincidence #expands (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 445
• The for-itself depends on the in-itself through an internal relation #expands (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1437
• The For-itself retroactively constitutes the past from which it appears born #complicates (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 479
• Only the for-itself has a past, the in-itself does not. #expands (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 422
• The For-itself is not a substance but the nihilation of a particular In-itself #expands (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1432