The Other’s mutual negation is required for being-for-others, not merely my own

Evidence

Being-for-others (être-pour-autrui). The third ekstasis (q.v.) of the For-itself. There arises here a new dimension of being in which my Self exists outside as an object for others. The For-others involves a perpetual conflict as each For-itself seeks to recover its own Being by directly or indirectly making an object out of the other. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1462 (#expands, via linked claim)

Every situation exists in the world; it is not of the same order as being. It is, in fact, essentially constituted out of Others; its objectivity is conditioned by the meaning that other subjectivities cast on being. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 444 (#expands, via linked claim)

Concerning the For-itself as such we should never say, “It is” in the sense that we say, for example, “It is nine o’clock;” that is, in the sense of the total equivalence of being with itself which posits and suppresses the self and which gives the external aspect of passivity. For the For-itself has the existence of an appearance coupled with a witness of a reflection which refers to a reflecting without there being any object of which the reflection would be the reflection. The For-itself does not have being because its being is always at a distance: its being is there in the reflecting, if you consider appearance, which is appearance or reflection only for the reflecting; it is there in the reflection if you consider the reflecting, which is no longer in itself anything more than a pure function of reflecting this reflection. Furthermore in itself the For-itself is not being, for it makes itself be explicitly for-itself as not being being. It is consciousness of —— as the internal negation of ——. The structure at the basis of intentionality and of selfness is the negation, which is the internal relation of the For-itself to the thing. The For-itself constitutes itself outside in terms of the thing as the negation of that thing; thus its first relation with being-in-itself is negation. It “is” in the mode of the For-itself; that is, as a separated existent inasmuch as it reveals itself as not being being. It doubly escapes being, by an internal disintegration and by express negation. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 445 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: A viable theory of the Other must rest on internal negation, not on God. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 678; The Other is constituted by negation as the self which is not myself — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 675; Hegel makes being-for-others a necessary condition of being-for-itself — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 686 (+9 more)

Broader Connections

• The situation is constituted from Others’ meanings rather than from being itself #expands (0.80) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 444
• Being-for-others generates perpetual conflict as each self objectifies the other #expands (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1462
• The For-itself’s being consists in internal negation rather than self-coincidence #complicates (0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 445
• Others’ meanings present themselves to me as objective, not as my own choices #expands (0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1207