The Other’s character is his facticity, given only to be surpassed

Evidence

There is no doubt that my belonging to an inhabited world has the value of a fact. It refers to the original fact of the Other’s presence in the world, a fact which, as we have seen, can not be deduced from the ontological structure of the for-itself. And although this fact only makes our facticity more deep-rooted, it does not evolve from our facticity in so far as the latter expresses the necessity of the contingency of the for-itself. Rather we must say: the for-itself exists in fact; that is, its existence can not be identical with a reality engendered in conformity to a law, nor can it be identical with a free choice. And among the factual characteristics of this “facticity”—i.e., among those which can neither be deduced nor proven but which simply “let themselves be seen”—there is one of these which we call the existence-in-the-world-in-the-presence-of-others. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1210 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Facticity is only ever graspable as already recovered and freely constructed — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 345; The Other’s body is given as his facticity regardless of presence or absence. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 894; The Other’s presence is a brute fact irreducibly distinct from the for-itself’s own facticity. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1210 (+5 more)

Broader Connections