Stereotypes can arise from role rationalization, not observed group differences

Evidence

Insofar as stereotypes arise in order to justify some system of social arrangements, they may arise out of false as well as “true” consciousness; the justification used may bear no relation to actual characteristics of the group. This was the case in the experiments conducted by Hoffman and Hurst (1990), who showed that stereotypes about childraisers and city workers develop not from observed differences in attributes or behaviors, but from a rationalization of the division of social roles. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2954

Eagly and Steffen (1984), for example, demonstrated that observers inferred “communal” characteristics from feminine roles (e.g., homemaker) and “agentic” characteristics from masculine roles (e.g., employee; see also Eagly & Diekman, ch. 2 this volume). Hoffman and Hurst (1990) used an experimental paradigm in which participants made trait ratings of fictional groups described as “child raisers” and “city workers.” They found that perceivers spontaneously stereotyped the group of child raisers as more patient, kind, and understanding than the city workers, and they stereotyped the group of city workers as more self-confident and forceful than the child raisers – especially when perceivers were first asked to explain why the groups occupied different roles. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1406

A fourth implication of our view is that stereotypes need not arise from a “kernel of truth,” as psychologists and laypersons have frequently assumed (e.g., see Allport, 1954; Brigham, 1971; Fishman, 1956). If the kernel of truth view holds that each stereotype must originate on the basis of some valid observation of differences between groups, then we disagree with it. Insofar as stereotypes arise in order to justify some system of social arrangements, they may arise out of false as well as “true” consciousness; the justification used may bear no relation to actual characteristics of the group. This was the case in the experiments conducted by Hoffman and Hurst (1990), who showed that stereotypes about childraisers and city workers develop not from observed differences in attributes or behaviors, but from a rationalization of the division of social roles. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2954

Categorization

• XREF: This connects to the general pattern in system justification theory that belief systems serve to rationalize existing arrangements, echoing the legitimation mechanisms emphasized throughout this book’s earlier chapters. — connects to: Social role arrangement alone produces justifying stereotypes in both parties. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology: Key Readings, 2914; Frontline work structure, not worker prejudice, creates receptivity to stereotypes — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of…, 844; Stereotype content reflects shared cultural views rather than individual contact. — Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype…, 41 (+2 more)
• DEFINE: Demonstrates the role-cue mechanism by which consensual stereotypes get generated — fictional groups described by role alone spontaneously attract trait attributions.
• corroborated: 4 independent passages support this claim — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2954; John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 1406; John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology: Key Readings, 2954