Affectivity is inseparable from materiality in Sartrean perception

Evidence

Th us understood, aff ectivity is not added to perceptual things retrospectively but is constituted together with their very presence, their being (EN, 650–52; BN, 770–72). Valueless theoretical objects are abstractions having a constitutive basis in primary aff ective objects. Th is means that the idea of a perception that would present the material object as pure extension and form, free of all aff ectivity, is an intellectual construct. Aff ectivity is not projected onto purely material objects of perception— there are no such objects— but aff ec tivity is constituted together with materiality itself. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 358

Categorization

• DEFINE: Articulates the radical claim that neutral, value-free perception is a derived abstraction, not a given — reversing a commonsense picture of perception.
• XREF: Undercuts a common reading that Sartre’s ontology is purely intellectualist; connects to the reader’s prior material on affectivity in Husserl. — connects to: Intentional affectivity directed at pain differs from pure body-consciousness; Coenesthesia is the affective, non-thetic texture of consciousness that projects surpass — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 876; Memory, fantasy, and perception all depend on the emotions — Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from…, 150 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Embodiment is the necessary contingent condition anchoring consciousness in the world for Sartre #expands (0.95) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 97