Sensory alteration is an achievement enabling sensation’s actualization

Evidence

We must now revisit De Anima to look at section 5 of Book II, entitled ‘The Faculty of Sensation’. The overall problem is as follows: ‘Sensation depends on a process of movement or change from without …, for it is held to be some sort of alteration (/λλ ωσ ς τις).’ Initially Aristotle will explain why it is not possible to understand the general mechanism of sensation without involving, at least hypothetically, the couple of being affected and being active. But the issue he must clarify is the question of ‘alteration’. What is of real importance is the detailed characterization of the type of alteration (/λλ ωσις) produced by sensation in general. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 429 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

Category: Definitional Content

Related

• Sensation is fundamentally defined as a species of alteration (similarity 0.95)
• Being altered by sensation counts as an achievement that actualizes potential (similarity 0.84)
• Sensation is the first stage through which substance awakens into subjectivity (similarity 0.82)
• Alteration has a privative and a conserving sense (similarity 0.82)
• Sensation requires an object other than the sense acting on it (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Sensation is fundamentally defined as a species of alteration #expands (0.85) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 429