Alteration has a privative and a conserving sense
Evidence
Something can be acted upon by the action of either of the two types of action, both of which are included in the notion of /λλ ωσις. On one hand, being acted upon can be understood as a corruption or as a destruction; on the other hand, it can be understood as a conservation or an accomplishment: ‘We must recognize two senses of alteration, viz, the change to conditions of privation (στερητικ5ς διαθ0σεις), and the change to a thing’s dispositions (εις) and to its nature’, says Aristotle. Hegel renders this conclusion as follows: ‘There is one change which is privative; and another which acts on the nature like a permanent energy (force and habit, ις).’ — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 447
Categorization
- DEFINE: Hegel’s gloss of Aristotle’s two senses of alteration — privative change vs. change to one’s dispositions — links hexis (habit) to ‘permanent energy.’
- XREF: connects to: Habit unites change with the preservation of its modifications. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 494; The past is fixed being while the future remains modifiable by freedom — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 454; Transformative change is gradual within continuities, not clean breaks (+4 more)
Broader Connections
- Aristotle distinguishes alteration that fulfills a subject from alteration that corrupts it.
#corroborates(0.92) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 414 - Sensation is fundamentally defined as a species of alteration
#exemplifies(0.85) - Habit unites change with the preservation of its modifications.
#expands(0.82) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 494 - Action modifies the being of things, not just their appearance
#expands(0.80) - Sensory alteration is an achievement enabling sensation’s actualization
#expands(0.80) - Transformative change is gradual within continuities, not clean breaks
#qualifies(0.78) - The past is fixed being while the future remains modifiable by freedom
#qualifies(0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 454