Sensation requires an object other than the sense acting on it

Evidence

Between the processes of sensory perception and those of understanding, the difference lies in the fact that, in the case of sensation, the objects that excite the sensory powers to activity, the seen, the heard, etc., are outside, … while what knowledge apprehends are the universals, and these are in a sense within the soul itself. That is why a man can think when he wants to, but his sensation does not depend on himself: a sensible object must be there. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 456 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Generally, about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter, in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or gold; what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or gold, but not qua bronze or gold: in a similar way the sense is affected by what is coloured or flavoured or sounding not in so far as each is what it is, but in so far as it is of such and such a sort and according to its form. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 433 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: The perceived object is irreducible to the consciousness that perceives it. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 142; Sensation is constituted as an inert exteriority whose reason for being lies outside itself; Even in experiments, perception is world-directed, not inner-sensation centered. (+7 more)

Broader Connections