Sensation is constituted as an inert exteriority whose reason for being lies outside itself

Evidence

Between the processes of sensory perception and those of understanding, the difference lies in the fact that, in the case of sensation, the objects that excite the sensory powers to activity, the seen, the heard, etc., are outside, … while what knowledge apprehends are the universals, and these are in a sense within the soul itself. That is why a man can think when he wants to, but his sensation does not depend on himself: a sensible object must be there. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 456 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Being reflected upon gives consciousness a sense of having an outside; Sensation involves a magical inherence of lived and living rather than spatial belonging — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 844; Sensation requires an object other than the sense acting on it (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Sensation requires an object other than the sense acting on it #corroborates (0.85)
• Thought is self-initiated while sensation requires an external object #expands (0.80) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 456