Thought is self-initiated while sensation requires an external object

Evidence

Between the processes of sensory perception and those of understanding, the difference lies in the fact that, in the case of sensation, the objects that excite the sensory powers to activity, the seen, the heard, etc., are outside, … while what knowledge apprehends are the universals, and these are in a sense within the soul itself. That is why a man can think when he wants to, but his sensation does not depend on himself: a sensible object must be there. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 456

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clarifies the Aristotelian distinction grounding νς’s self-activity — phenomenology of thinking as spontaneous versus receptive.
• XREF: Echoes Kant’s receptive/pontaneous distinction and speaks to why the brain’s active construction of perception differs from passive registration. — connects to: Imagination differs from perception in conscious attitude, not object content; Sensation is constituted as an inert exteriority whose reason for being lies outside itself; Touch mediates self and Other by uniting what it also keeps distinct — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 351 (+9 more)

Broader Connections

• Knowledge requires mental reflection on existence rather than passive sensory impressions #corroborates (0.82) — Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 693
• Reflection is consciousness attempting to become its own object #expands (0.78)
• Self-consciousness need not posit the self as an object #expands (0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 10