Self-maintenance criteria for moral worth fail to set defensible boundaries

Evidence

But the possibility of a self-repairing machine actually seems to be a problem for the definition, to the extent that it is offered as an explication either of life or of the boundary of moral consideration. And being self-repairing is not the same as being self-valuing, since a self-repairing machine is not necessarily self-valuing. More importantly, the criterion might give us a reason to value those things it marks out, but it does not give us a reason to stop valuing things at just this point; that is, not to value anything else. Can’t we value a person who is not self-valuing; for example, a potential suicide? — Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 775

Categorization

  • XREF: The suicidal-person counterexample uses exactly the same logic Plumwood applies to the master’s gaze in her care-ethics critique — a person’s value cannot depend on them serving as self-valuing. — connects to: Moral respect applies wherever autonomous teleology exists — Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 774; Moral self-regulation is not a fixed conscience but can be selectively disengaged — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3940; Virtuous character does not yield consistent moral behavior across situations — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 202 (+4 more)

Broader Connections