Sartre sees the Other’s gaze as falsifying essence-free being

Evidence

For Sartre, the Other’s freedom off ers an illusory promise of self-closure: by confi rming my objective existence in the Other’s world, the Other totalizes me, but this totalization confers a fi xed essence upon a being that has no essence, and therefore it is a falsifi cation. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 632

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines Sartre’s notion of totalization and why it constitutes falsification for a being that has no essence.
• XREF: connects to: A third observer can disarm the Other’s gaze by transcending it in turn; Sartre proposed an existentialist psychoanalysis rejecting Freud’s layered unconscious — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 710; Sartre saw black poetry as reversing the oppressive colonial gaze — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 863 (+5 more)

Broader Connections

• Sartre’s denial of ontological being-for-others grounds his hostile intersubjectivity #expands (0.95) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 656
• Sartre distinguishes the human other from all other objects of the world. #expands (0.85) — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 504