Sartre holds that being-for-others remains derivative of being-for-itself

Evidence

Th e Other makes me live the situation of my “being-forothers.” However, s/ he does not have the power to fi x me as an object who lives permanently in the mode of my “being-for-others.” I can regain my “being-foritself” when I transcend the objective presence of others (through an act of internal negation) and realize that I am responsible for their existence. In this (ideal) scenario they remain on the outside of my consciousness, as intentional objects of perception, since ultimately, my “being-for-others” is entirely derivative of my “being-for-itself.” — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 260

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Sartre divides being into free for-itself consciousness and inert in-itself matter — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist CafĂ©: Freedom,…, 496; Sartre’s denial of ontological being-for-others grounds his hostile intersubjectivity — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 656; Sartre sees the Other’s gaze as falsifying essence-free being — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 632 (+5 more)

Broader Connections