Caseload volume does not determine how much courts rely on plea bargaining

Evidence

Also, if plea bargaining were a result of heavy caseloads, then courts with heavier caseloads would rely on plea bargaining more than would courts with lighter caseloads. That is not the case. Some low-volume courts rely heavily on plea bargaining. But some high-volume courts—those in Baltimore and Los Angeles, for example—conduct large numbers of trials.7” So caseload pressures alone cannot account for plea bargaining. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1768

Categorization

• XREF: Model case of the falsification logic the course stresses: testing a proposed cause (caseload) against contrary instances. Pairs with other institutional-explanation debates in the course. — connects to: Litigant demand, not judicial discretion, determines district court dockets — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 275; Rising caseloads without matching resources drove the spread of plea bargaining — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1765; Caseload pressures alone cannot explain plea bargaining rates (+12 more)

Broader Connections

• Caseload pressures alone cannot explain plea bargaining rates #corroborates (1.00)
• Plea bargaining persists even when caseload and evidence cannot explain it #corroborates (1.00) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1773
• Plea bargaining stems from institutional actors’ shared interest in speed, not caseloads #corroborates (1.00) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1780
• Plea bargaining dominated criminal case processing long before modern caseload growth #expands (0.90) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1767
• Plea bargaining dominated American courts by the early 1900s, not recently #expands (0.90) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1767
• Plea bargaining operates as a rough informal system of precedent #complicates (0.80) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1751
• Prosecutors, not judges, dominate U.S. criminal outcomes via plea bargaining #complicates (0.80)
• No evidence shows plea bargaining is more corrupt than trial disposition #complicates (0.70) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1810
• Racial disparity in plea bargaining is nearly unstudied despite its centrality #complicates (0.70) — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law, 619
• Criticisms of plea bargaining often actually target features of the criminal justice system generally #complicates (0.70) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1810
• Guilty pleas, not trials, now dominate criminal case disposition #complicates (0.70)
• US influence transplanted plea bargaining into Brazil’s civil-law system #complicates (0.70)
• Racial disparities in judicial outcomes do not necessarily prove unequal treatment #complicates (0.70)