Republican civic virtue and a game-theoretic view of democracy can be reconciled.

Evidence

However, I believe that there is a compatibility between conceiving democracy as an acceptability game (as Pettit 2012 does) and Vincent Ostrom’s (1997) focus on how “cooperative activities depend on undertaking contingent agreements subject to plausible commitments” (113). The thinner concept of civic virtue employed by many neo- Roman republicans is not at odds with how Vincent Ostrom conceptualizes the need for common knowledge and mutual trust, conceived as being “at least as important as the economic and political conditions” (114). Furthermore, the concept of shared community of understanding can ultimately be understood as “accruing as a form of social capital” (V. Ostrom 1997, 214), which means that we might interpret it in a thinner way as well. Thus, I believe that while the concepts with which V. Ostrom and republicans operate are distinct, they remain compatible. — Adelin-Costin Dumitru, Forging the Resistive Republic, 73

Categorization

  • XREF: Echoes the reader’s broader interest in how thick normative concepts can be ‘thinned’ into social capital and trust language — relates to institutionalist reductions of civic virtue. — connects to: Civic virtue advances republican freedom instrumentally, not intrinsically. — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 65; Well-designed republican institutions can generate norms of policy-making through games of acceptability. — Adelin-Costin Dumitru, Forging the Resistive Republic: Social
, 19; Republican civic virtue is thin enough to suit pluralist societies — Adelin-Costin Dumitru, Forging the Resistive Republic: Social
, 27
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Adelin-Costin Dumitru, Forging the Resistive Republic: Social
, 73