Plain-meaning interpretation itself presupposes a policy rule favoring literal reading

Evidence

Pe rhaps he ur oses of law would be best served b la aal-flatule that General words in a e ic are expressed without qualification are to be read without qualification - so long at least as the result is not totally absurdo Is it inaccurate to say that Dean Pound seems to be assuming the existence of such a rule? — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1989

Categorization

• XREF: Directly pays off the ch36/ch37 treatment of implied exceptions and equating equivocation with exclusion. — connects to: Judges test statutory reach by asking how the lawmaker would answer if consulted — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1902; Interpretation has two genuine tasks distinct from filling gaps in deficient rules — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1973; Reading a statute’s specific procedure as exclusive prohibition is a contested interpretive choice — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 2957 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• Literal statutory interpretations are defeasible starting points #expands (0.80) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 303