Procedural norms substitute for substantive control when outcomes are hard to specify.

Evidence

When it is structurally difficult to tell agents how to behave or exercise their discretion properly, and even more formidable to specify the desired outcomes of their efforts, norms that procedurally constrain the agency process provide an alternative. The relationship between these general norms and the unique contractual norms that ideally control a given agency relationship is somewhat akin to that between procedural law and substantive law or secondary rules and primary ones (Hart 1961). — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 62

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines procedural norms via the procedural/substantive and secondary/primary rule analogies (Hart).
• XREF: Secondary rules versus primary ones links to H.L.A. Hart’s legal philosophy. — connects to: Procedural norms substitute for outcome-control when agent behavior is hard to specify.; Rules function as rules only if they tolerate some suboptimal outcomes — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 223; Power functions by controlling the exceptional rather than by sanctioning (+8 more)

Broader Connections

• Rules function as rules only if they tolerate some suboptimal outcomes #qualifies (0.80) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 223
• Productive intellectual conflict requires explicit procedural manners of engagement. #exemplifies (0.80)
• Adversaries in indeterminate games mutually construct the norms that govern their conflict #expands (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 379
• Parliamentary voting order materially shapes which outcomes can be coerced #exemplifies (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 91
• Power functions by controlling the exceptional rather than by sanctioning #complicates (0.72)