Procedural norms substitute for outcome-control when agent behavior is hard to specify.
Evidence
When it is structurally difficult to tell agents how to behave or exercise their discretion properly, and even more formidable to specify the desired outcomes of their efforts, norms that procedurally constrain the agency process provide an alternative. The relationship between these general norms and the unique contractual norms that ideally control a given agency relationship is somewhat akin to that between procedural law and substantive law or secondary rules and primary ones (Hart 1961). — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 62 (
#corroborates, via linked claim)
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Procedural norms substitute for substantive control when outcomes are hard to specify. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 62; Procedural rules for information offer conventions, not objective truth, for interpreting agents’ data. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 67; Missing counterfactuals make outcome-based evaluation of street-level programs impossible — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of…, 390
Related
- Procedural norms substitute for substantive control when outcomes are hard to specify. (similarity 0.87)
- Procedural rules for information offer conventions, not objective truth, for interpreting agents’ data. (similarity 0.81)
Broader Connections
- Procedural norms substitute for substantive control when outcomes are hard to specify.
#corroborates(0.98) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 62