Price discrimination generally does not create monopoly or harm competition

Evidence

Although Director and Levi conceded that their economic analysis did not necessitate a change in the status quo law because the courts may reason that the law has more to do with rules of fair conduct—an alternative to the position of Director and Levi that carried some weight in 1956—than with adherence to economic analysis, they pointed out: “The important point, however, is that the restrictions or abuses will not in most cases carry with them the normal incidents of monopoly” (p. 294). In other words, price discrimination, whatever its permutation, did not adversely influence competition or surreptitiously tend to create monopoly. — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 1144

Categorization

• XREF: This anticipates the later Chicago antitrust revolution’s hostility to treating price discrimination as exclusionary. — connects to: Director held that market monopoly power does not spill across separate markets — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making…, 1111; Patent tying and vertical integration are really price discrimination, not monopoly extension. — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making…, 1143; Predatory price cuts harm competition regardless of the seller’s intent — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 564