Playersâ full giving histories are made visible to everyone in the group.
Evidence
In each round of an indirect reciprocity game, each potential receiverâs history of giving both in the indirect reciprocity and the public goods game was displayed simultaneously for all players. â Hans-JĂŒrge, Reputation helps solve the `tragedy ofâŠ, 14
Categorization
- XREF: Total visibility across game types mirrors the readerâs âtotal visibility and subtle audience effectsâ premise about 1870s New York elite scrutiny. â connects to: Particular encounters acquire symbolic weight because players know reputation is at stake â Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 381
Related
- Reputation earned in one social game sustains cooperation in separate social dilemmas. (similarity 0.80)
- Particular encounters acquire symbolic weight because players know reputation is at stake (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- Particular encounters acquire symbolic weight because players know reputation is at stake
#complicates(0.78) â Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 381