Philosophy reconciles content and form as a sensed, non-representable absolute form

Evidence

Nevertheless, in so far as it is a dialectical reconciliation of content and form, philosophy remains an activity of ‘form-donation’: it is, moreover, the ‘Dasein adequate to’ spirit. To say this is to say that philosophy is a form which, while it is neither intuitable nor representable, remains all the same something that can be sensed. ‘Absolute form’ enjoys a fundamental relationship to sensibility. For how could one be a philosopher without being affected by the philosophical content? — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 961

Categorization

• DEFINE: Explains the defining paradox of philosophy’s ‘absolute form’ — neither intuitable nor representable, yet still sensible and affecting the philosopher.
• XREF: connects to: Croce’s content-form identity is a philosophic category, not literary technique — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 1663; Philosophy’s act is cognition that liberates content from the one-sidedness of its separate forms — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 951; Philosophy’s absolute form, though not intuitable, remains fundamentally sensible (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Philosophy’s absolute form, though not intuitable, remains fundamentally sensible #expands (0.92)
• Philosophical propositions dialectically preserve, suppress, and present their cancelled form #expands (0.80)
• Form and content are mutually translatable terms in dialectical criticism #complicates (0.75) — Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form, 769