Philosophy about the brain wrongly reduces to reductionism versus antireductionism.

Evidence

The elaboration of dialectical thinking about the brain also allows us to escape the strict alternative between reductionism and antireductionism, the theoretical trap within which philosophy too often confines itself. On one side —that of the cognitive sciences, in particular—we find massive affirmation of the possibility of an absolute naturalization of cognition and mental processes. On the other, we find the affirmation of the perfectly transcendental character of thought, irreducible to biological determinations. — Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, 264

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Brain science disguises ideological presuppositions that philosophers must expose — Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, 54; Negative Dialectics positioned itself against both the philosophy of science and traditional epistemology — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,…, 643; The neuronal-mental continuity thesis is a philosophical stance, not a scientific postulate — Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, 184
• yield-rescued: below the book’s yield-target cutoff, included anyway for connecting to: Brain science disguises ideological presuppositions that philosophers must expose — Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, 54; Negative Dialectics positioned itself against both the philosophy of science and traditional epistemology — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,…, 643; The neuronal-mental continuity thesis is a philosophical stance, not a scientific postulate — Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, 184