No one can prove every mental activity reduces to neuronal configurations.

Evidence

Fascinating as they may be, these analyses remain insuffi- cient on many points. Despite the apparent assurance and certitude that govern the discourse of the ”adherence” of the mental to the neuronal, the process of the ”translation” of the givens from one domain to the other remains obscure. No matter what is said about it, this ”translation,” for all its plausibility with respect to its function, remains questionable with respect to its lawfulness: it has never managed to be truly constituted as a law, nor to acquire thereby the value of a universal. No one today is in a position to prove that all cognitive, emotional, or practical activities are the reformulated and resystematized equivalents of neuronal configurations. — Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, 204

Categorization

• DEFINE: Establishes the ‘translation’ model the book is critiquing — the mental-to-neuronal mapping that is claimed but never lawful.