The neuronal-mental continuity thesis is a philosophical stance, not a scientific postulate

Evidence

It is the weakest because the certainty of the continuity between the neuronal and the mental can obviously never be a strictly scientific postulate. It necessarily constitutes a philosophical or epistemological position and such positions are not always clearly articulated. I will therefore attempt to question the presuppositions attached to this continuity, not to contest it in itself but to show that its development and function are precisely discontinuous—that it is, in other words, a question of a complex continuity. — Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, 184

If there is always a mental dimension to the neuronal and a neuronal dimension to the mental, then we must suppose that this continuity is in some way itself at once neuronal and mental, biological and cultural, or, if we anticipate the ”translations,” at once an object of observation and an interpretive postulate. The continuity from the neuronal to the mental, let us recall, is in essence a theoretical mixture, at once experimental and hermeneutic, as Damasio’s recourse to the metaphors of narrative and text reveals. — Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, 205

Categorization

• XREF: Relevant to the analogous brain-workplace continuity assumption the reader wants to test — is the analogy argued or asserted? — connects to: Neuropsychoanalysis is a working discipline rather than a settled science — Catherine Malabou, The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain…, 474
• DEEPTHINKING: Malabou’s core move: the alleged biological continuity is itself a hermeneutic construct disguised as observation. This epistemic insight frames her whole plasticity-vs-flexibility argument.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, 184; Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, 205