Pan-Arab solidarity required Israel as an external enemy after the imperialist threat receded

Evidence

As the ā€œimperialistā€ West became a valued economic (and often political) partner of the newly independent postcolonial states, pan-Arabism needed an enemy, an ā€œoppositional other,ā€ to keep the fire burning. And that enemy was Israel, a colonial state openly racist against Arabs and with a military doctrine at odds with pan-Arabism. ā€œArab leaders often vented their differences by staking claims to being the primary defenders of Arab rights and interests: anti- Zionism became the showcase cause of pan-Arabism, the vehicle for leaders to show their pan-Arabist credentials, or a way to protect themselves from those possessing them [their populations]… Instances in which Arab leaders deflected internal threats by mobilizing opinion against foreign enemies (e.g. Israel) and constructing external (symbolic) alliances were so frequent that the Middle East of the 1960s is a veritable laboratory for testing the hypothesized link between internal and external conflictā€ (Lebovic, 2004: 170). — Youssef Cherif, Neo-pan-Arabism, 26

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly serves the reader’s research on manufactured external enemies sustaining group solidarity — the clearest non-European case. Connects to the Lebanese Civil War/unification literatures and general scapegoat theories of group cohesion. — connects to: Egyptian hostility to Israel stemmed from Arab identity politics, not intrinsic enmity; US global dominance in the Middle East required Israel as the region’s key ally; Arab political solidarity dissolved once cold war patrons and external enemies receded. — Youssef Cherif, Neo-pan-Arabism: a renewed contract of…, 39 (+2 more)
  • ADDENDUM: Parallel to ā€˜On Sacrifice’ framing of rituals sustaining hierarchical solidarity, and to how cohesion manufactured against an other behaves.

Broader Connections