Ordoliberalism institutionalized competition policy and an independent central bank against parliamentary control

Evidence

To make this happen, the appropriate state policy was not to set the conditions of investment or to manipulate the level of prices via monetary stimulus, as the Keynesians argued. Instead, given its concern with limiting private power, competition policy, supported by the monetary policy of a politically independent central bank, formed the institutional core of the economic constitution. A dedicated monopoly office would ensure that the economy as a whole conformed to the meta-rules of competition, while an independent monetary authority would play the supporting role of keeping prices stable. Both institutions would be separate from and would not directly answer to the parliamentary state. — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 364

Categorization

• XREF: This is the intellectual blueprint for the ECB and EU competition regime — the direct institutional bridge to Mattei and modern European austerity. — connects to: Independent conservative central bankers can credibly commit against inflation where politicians cannot — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 423; Ordoliberalism justifies replacing democratic governance with rules and the ECB — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 377; Central bank independence shifted economic decision-making beyond electoral reach — Clara E. Mattei, Escape from Capitalism, 421 (+10 more)

Broader Connections

• Ordoliberalism justifies replacing democratic governance with rules and the ECB #expands (0.90) — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 377