Ordoliberalism justifies replacing democratic governance with rules and the ECB

Evidence

If states have broken the rules, the only possible policy is a diet of strict austerity to bring them back into conformity with the rules, plus automatic sanctions for those who cannot stay within the rules. There are no fallacies of composition, only good and bad policies. And since states, from an ordoliberal viewpoint, cannot be relied upon to provide the necessary austerity because they are prone to capture, we must have rules and an independent monetary authority to ensure that states conform to the ordo imperative; hence, the ECB. Then, and only then, will growth return. In the case of Greece and Italy in 2011, if that meant deposing a few democratically elected governments, then so be it. — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 377

Categorization

  • SEED: The crescendo — rules as a technology that overrides electoral democracy — is argumentative payoff worth revisiting.
  • XREF: Ties into broader literature on post-democracy and the EU’s democratic deficit. — connects to: Ordoliberalism institutionalized competition policy and an independent central bank against parliamentary control — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 364; German ordoliberalism was exported to Europe via the ECB constitution and Euro rules — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 375; The EU’s constitutional design embodies German ordoliberal principles — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 374 (+4 more)

Broader Connections