Only empirical research can separate broad racial beliefs from specific policy judgments

Evidence

Academic research does not fit very clearly anywhere in this picture, which may explain why there has been so little of it compared with argumentation that is not empirically based. That is unfortunate for at least two reasons. First, some fascinating research questions are so far left untouched. Second, in my view only reasonably dispassionate analyses could provide the possibility of intellectual space for people to separate their broad beliefs about the role of race in America from their particular judgments about the efficacy of affirmative action compared with other possible routes to racial equality. Only if there is a cohort of people who can persuasively say, “it works in this regard but not in that one…” or “it works better than X but not as well as Y to achieve goal Z…” have we as a nation any chance to get past the shouting. — David Theo Goldberg, John Solomos, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies, 2006 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

A third critique is that some symbolic racism items are “too close” in content to the policy dependent variables they purport to predict. If the same variable has indeed been placed on both sides of the equation, the coefficients for symbolic racism might better be interpreted as reflecting its tautological content overlap with policy preference measures, not the independent causal force of symbolic racism (Chong 2000; Hurwitz and Peffley 1998; Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000; Schuman 2000; Sidanius et al. 1999). For example, Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell note that a racial resentment item asking whether “most blacks who receive money from welfare programs could get along without it if they tried” (2000, 269) was included in a scale predicting opposition to welfare (Kinder and Sanders 1996, p. 122), and symbolic racism items about government attention to blacks in general have been used to predict opposition to specific government policies providing special treatment to blacks (e.g., Sears et al. 1997). The critique seems well taken in both specific examples. To be sure, they are the exception rather than the rule in studies of symbolic racism. Still, even occasional instances could lead both to overestimating the effects of symbolic racism and to misinterpreting them as reflecting racism when they might just reflect opposition to big government on both sides of the equation. — Christopher Tarman and David O. Sears, The Conceptualization and Measurement…, 24 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Academics should police policy claims for plausibility rather than merely teach; Only empirically grounded analysis can separate broad racial beliefs from program judgments. — David Theo Goldberg, John Solomos, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies, 2006; Social desirability bias does not inflate symbolic racism’s link to policy views — Christopher Tarman and David O. Sears, The Conceptualization and Measurement…, 226 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Only empirically grounded analysis can separate broad racial beliefs from program judgments. #corroborates (0.97) — David Theo Goldberg, John Solomos, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies, 2006
• Some symbolic racism items overlap tautologically with the policy attitudes they predict #complicates (0.82) — Christopher Tarman and David O. Sears, The Conceptualization and Measurement…, 24