Neurology cannot explain what makes mental transitions possible

Evidence

Basically, ”change,” ”translation,” ”account,” and ”narrative” are too vague and, without further analysis, do not let us grasp simultaneously the transition from one level of organization to another (from the neuronal to the mental), the transition from one organizational regime to another (from the selfconservation of the proto-self to the exploratory activity of consciousness), and the transition from one organizational given to another (the proto-self is a genetic given; the self that manipulates images and signs is a biological-cultural given). We do not truly know what originally makes these transitions possible: Are they biologically programmed? Are they the fruit of experience or of individual history? Are they the result of both? — Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, 210

Categorization

• QUESTION: Naming three distinct transition types (level, regime, given) that neuroscience conflates gives a checklist to apply against plasticity claims in a memo.
• XREF: connects to: Joining psychoanalysis and neurology remains an unfinished project — Catherine Malabou, The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain…, 443; Sequential descriptive psychology leaves every causal transition unexplained — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1320