Natural-kind categories license inferences but forbid membership change

Evidence

If people believe that a category is a natural kind, then two important principles follow. First, a natural category affords inductive potential; that is, one can infer a lot about members of the category because such things are true of all members. When people see a robin sitting on a branch, they can assume certain things about it (e.g., it can fly, eats worms, chirps, etc.). Such inductive potential is greater for natural kinds than for artifactual categories. Second, membership in a natural kind is unalterable. A robin is a robin, and no amount of blue spray-paint will transform it into a bluebird. In contrast, the fundamental “nature” of an artifactual category object can be changed, for the simple reason that it has no underlying essence (apart from its function). — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1387 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

The categories used in the legal process must be left ambiguous in order to permit the infusion of new ideas. — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 243 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Regulated trade terms bind licensees to their defined meanings — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1576; Believing a category is a natural kind licenses strong inferences and immutability. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1387; Believing a category is natural grants inference power and permanence (+7 more)

Broader Connections

• Believing a category is a natural kind licenses strong inferences and immutability. #corroborates (0.98) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1387
• Believing a category is natural grants inference power and permanence #corroborates (0.97)
• Legal categories remain ambiguous to accommodate changing community values #complicates (0.76) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 243